Vietnam's Health Care Fund for the Poor (HCFP) uses government revenues to finance health care for the poor, ethnic minorities living in selected mountainous provinces designated as difficult, and all households living in communes officially designated as highly disadvantaged. The program, which started in 2003, did not as of 2004 include all these groups, but those who were included (about 15% of the population) were disproportionately poor. Estimates of the program's impact-obtained using single differences and propensity score matching on a trimmed sample-suggest that HCFP has substantially increased service utilization, especially inpatient care, and has reduced the risk of catastrophic spending. It has not, however, reduced average out-of-pocket spending, and appears to have negligible impacts on utilization among the poorest decile.
I. INTRODUCTION
Out-of-pocket spending continues to be the dominant source of health care finance in many developing countries. Where insurance does exist, it tends to be concentrated among formal sector workers, leaving those in the informal sector with a choice of whether to use services and risk impoverishing themselves and the family, or going without needed health care. This choice is especially stark for poor households, who in some countries end up using services less yet also spend a larger share of their income on health than the better off.
Several developing (and industrialized) countries have tried to tackle this problem by introducing subsidized or free government-run health insurance for the poor, and allowing (or requiring) nonpoor informal sector households to enroll on a contributory basis. In 1993, Colombia introduced a noncontributory or subsidized scheme within its social health insurance (SHI) program (Escobar and Panopolou 2003) . In 2003, Mexico introduced its Seguro Popular scheme, a voluntary health insurance program operating alongside those for formal sector workers, into which all households except those in the poorest quintile (who are covered at the taxpayer's expense) are to contribute according to their income (Knaul and Frenk 2005) . Within its PhilHealth SHI program, the Philippines has a tax-financed scheme for the indigent (Obermann et al. 2006) . In 2003, China introduced a new voluntary and subsidized health insurance program for rural residents, with the contributions of the poor paid by the taxpayer (Liu and Rao 2006; . Also in 2003, Vietnam introduced a program where the poor (and other underprivileged groups) are (or soon will be) enrolled at the taxpayer's expense in the social health insurance scheme for formal sector workers.
Because many of these initiatives were introduced only recently, their impacts are only now being evaluated.
1 This paper reports the results of an impact evaluation of 1 Inevitably because it is oldest, Colombia's reform that has been the most studied (cf. e.g. Panopoulu and Velez 2001; Trujillo, Portillo and Vernon 2005; Gaviria, Medina and Mejía 2006) . For an early evaluation of China's and Mexico's recent reforms, see and Gakidou et al. (2006) .
Vietnam's scheme, known as the Health Care Fund for the Poor (HCFP). 2 Vietnam relies heavily on out-of-pocket payments to finance health care-nearly three-quarters of health spending is financed out-of-pocket (Knowles et al. 2005) . A high fraction of Vietnamese households experience catastrophic and/or impoverishing out-of-pocket payments, and
Vietnam fares worse in this respect than many other countries around the world; this is despite the fact that the poor use services less (Prescott 1997; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003; Xu et al. 2003; O'Donnell et al. 2006; Van Doorslaer et al. 2006; Van Doorslaer et al. 2006 ).
HCFP replaced a program initiated in 2002 known as Free Health Care Cards for
the Poor, in which 1.5 million people (out of a target of 4 million) were enrolled in
Vietnam's SHI scheme. 3 Some provincial governments opted for a different approach, issuing the poor with a health card, and reimbursing facilities directly out of government funds. This initiative experienced a number of problems. Local governments were reliant on their own funds to finance the scheme, which posed a considerable challenge for local governments especially those where poverty rates were high. The amount of money per beneficiary that was mandated for the program was in any event relatively small. This led to narrow and shallow coverage: the monies transferred to the SHI agency (Vietnam Social Security, or VSS) were lower than its revenue per member in other schemes, and the amounts paid to providers were also limited. This led to care being rationed according to funds available, coverage of only some treatment costs (drugs, for example, were rarely covered), and a reluctance on the part of providers to treat patients in the scheme.
People also had to apply to be included in the scheme, and the application process was long and complex; many were unaware of its existence. And finally, care was often available under the scheme only at one provider, often the local district hospital, which is often many miles from the homes of poor people.
HCFP marked a departure from this initiative: substantial central government finance is involved and provincial governments are also required to contribute some resources; clear eligibility criteria are laid down and people are automatically considered 2 See Knowles et al. (2005) and Capuno et al. (2006) for further details of HCFP and the previous schemes it replaced. 3 Vietnam had a number of schemes in place before the 2002 Health Care Cards initiative. All experienced a number of problems. See World Bank et al. (2001) , Knowles et al. (2005) and Capuno et al. (2006) Like much of the recent literature on impact evaluation, the present study controls for observed heterogeneity through the use of propensity score matching. However, unlike many recent impact evaluations (cf. e.g. Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005; Chen, Mu and Ravallion 2006; Wagstaff and Yu 2007) , the present one employs single differences (comparing households in the program with ones outside it) rather than double differences (looking at differences in changes between 'treated' and 'untreated' households before and after a program's implementation). The reason for using single differences is that there are no suitable baseline data that would allow to the provincial department of labor and social affairs for final approval.
III. METHODS
The impacts of HCFP are estimated by comparing out-of-pocket payments and utilization between those covered by HCFP and comparable individuals not covered.
Comparability is assessed by means of propensity score matching, the propensity score measuring the closeness (in terms of a vector of observable characteristics) of 'treated'
and 'untreated' individuals. The score is simply the predicted probability of an individual being covered by HCFP. A treated individual's outcome is compared with a counterfactual outcome, formed as a weighted average of the outcomes of untreated individuals, where the weights reflect the propensity scores, the exact weighting scheme depending on the variant of PSM used (discussed below). The differences are then averaged to get the average treatment effect (on the treated).
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This approach ensures that account is taken of the fact that households selected for HCFP coverage differ in a variety of observable respects from those not selected;
failure to take this into account would result in biased estimates of the impact of HCFP.
Individuals in the 'treated' and 'untreated' groups who are too dissimilar from the other group are discarded, and the focus is on a subsample for which good matches can be found for the treated individuals in the untreated group. What this approach does not do is to take into account the possibility that individuals are selected in part on the basis of unobservable variables and these variables also influence outcomes. As indicated in the Introduction, the frequently used approach of double-differencing with panel data and sweeping out time-invariant unobservable variables is not an option in this case, since it requires that the program has not yet been implemented in the baseline, and the only survey that could serve as a baseline (the 2002 VHLSS) was undertaken after the precursors to HCFP has already started.
Are there reasonable grounds for believing there to be selection into HCFP on unobservables? And are the likely biases likely to be large? Certainly, there are stories one could tell. Ethnicity is, of course fixed, at least in principle, and cannot be influenced by unobservables that also influence out-of-pocket spending and health utilization. But it might be correlated with such unobservables. The same is true of whether or not someone lives in a commune covered by Decision 135. Which direction such unobservables bias the estimated impact of HCFP is unclear. In the case of poverty status, the direction of bias seems clearer. In this case, the indicator determining eligibility could indeed be influenced by unobservables. Local officials may be tempted to err on the side of including a near-poor household that is known to have a history of high medical expenses or of needing care and finding it unaffordable. While this information may be known by the commune official and the villagers, it is likely to be unobservable in the survey data. In this case, the program's impact on utilization will be overestimated by the methods used-some of those included in the program would have had high rates of utilization anyway. And the reduction in out-of-pocket payments might be underestimated; the bias might in fact lead one to concluding that the program increases out-of-pocket payments.
These possible biases are worth keeping in mind. But are they likely to be large?
It could reasonably be argued that they ought to be smaller in the case of HCFP than in the case of an insurance scheme where people choose to participate, as in, say, China's new rural health insurance program, or where they have to apply to be considered for inclusion, as in, say, Colombia's noncontributory health insurance scheme and Mexico's Seguro Popular scheme (in both cases, households have to request to go through an assessment process to have their eligibility determined). In such settings whether or not someone is in the program is partly the result of their own decisions, and is potentially influenced by unobservable variables rather than simply being correlated with them. The bias due to unobservables seems likely to be larger in such cases than in the present one.
Nonetheless, the possibility of bias needs to be borne in mind.
In PSM, the propensity score is typically estimated by means of a probit, where the two outcomes are whether the person is in the program or not. In this case, people are classified as being covered by HCFP if they either have a free health card or have been given free health insurance. 8 The propensity score is the predicted probability of being covered by HCFP. The (potential) control group is formed from nonbeneficiaries who are eligible for HCFP; this group represents the comparison group of most relevant to policy.
After the estimation of the propensity scores, ineligible individuals are dropped from the analysis. Additional cases (both treated and untreated) were also dropped to further improve comparability. The approach adopted in this paper is that suggested by Crump et al. (2006) , who suggest trimming the sample in such a way as to minimize the variance of the estimated average treatment effects. The implications of this for the sample used are discussed further below. All the control group cases retained in the analysis are used to construct the counterfactual outcome for the treated individuals (i.e. the HCFP beneficiaries) via kernel matching. 9 This can be thought of as a weighted regression of the outcome on the treatment indicator variable, the kernel weights being a decreasing function of the absolute difference in propensity score between the treated and untreated unit (Smith and Todd 2005) . 10 The sensitivity of the results to the choice of estimator are checked by matching treated and untreated cases via weights based directly on the propensity score. This estimator can also be implemented as a weighted regression of the outcome on the treatment indicator, where the weight is one for a treated unit, and P/(1-P) for the untreated unit, P being the (estimated) propensity score (cf. Imbens 2004) . The regression implementation reduces the computational burden, substantially in the case where there are many outcome indicators. 11 A further attraction is that it facilitates estimates of differences in impact across subsamples. In the present context, given the specific focus of the program on the poor, an obvious dimension along which to explore differential impact is income. By regressing the outcome on the treatment indicator, income (or, more accurately, consumption) category dummies, and interactions between the two, weighting the regression by the kernel or propensity score weights, one can obtain estimates of the impacts for the different income groups. 12 The regression using propensity score weights leads directly to robust standard errors. In the case of kernel matching, standard errors are obtained through bootstrapping with 100 replications.
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9 Cf. nearest-neighbor matching which results in a further dropping of cases that are not close enough in terms of their propensity scores. 10 A normal (Gaussian) kernel was used with a bandwidth of 0.06. 11 The regression routine in Stata is much faster than psmatch2 or other matching routines. The kernel weights need be estimated just for one outcome (which can be done using psmatch2), and then used in regressions for the other outcomes. 12 This method also provides a simple way to obtain impacts for different income groups using the DD without matching. With or without matching (i.e. weighting), the impact for a particular income group is the sum of the coefficient on the NCMS treatment indicator plus the coefficient on the interaction between the treatment dummy and the income group dummy. 13 These turn out to be similar in fact to those obtained from the regression. The reservations that have been expressed about bootstrapping standard errors in matching do not apply to the kernel method, because it does not run into the discontinuities that arise in nearest-neighbor matching (see e.g. Imbens 2004 ). The 14% of the sample that is covered is disproportionately poor: the concentration curve for the HCFP scheme in Figure 1 is far above the diagonal; the poorest 10% of the population accounts for over 30% of HCFP beneficiaries, and the poorest 20% of the population accounts for just over 50% of beneficiaries. Table 2 are the descriptive statistics of variables that might plausibly affect coverage through one or other of the HCFP modalities. In principle, none of these additional variables ought to influence inclusion in HCFP once account has been taken of official poverty status, whether the household is an ethnic minority household living in a designated disadvantaged mountainous province, and whether it is located in a commune benefiting from Decision 135. However, because HCFP coverage falls below the target rate, the additional variables in Table 3 reports the results for the probit model used to obtain the propensity scores. As well as providing the basis for the propensity scores for the matching procedure, the results in Table 3 second column shows the differences on the common support after weighting using the propensity score, and the third the standardized differences using the kernel-based weights, again on the trimmed sample. In Table 5 , the trimming of the sample and both methods of weighting result in a much greater degree of balance in the covariates. In the kernel weighting approach, the mean standardized difference between the HCFP beneficiaries and the uninsured is reduced by over 80%. Even after weighting, however, some significant differences remain. So, the bias due to observables-while substantially reduced through the trimming and use of PSM-might not be entirely eliminated. This is especially true where the propensity scores are used as weights.
IV. DATA, DECSRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND TARGETING

Also included in
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VI. IMPACTS Table 6 and Table 9 report the estimates of HCFP impacts on the sample as a whole and by per capita consumption decile (the deciles of the full sample, not the subsample of HCFP eligible individuals). Included in are the outcomes among HCFP beneficiaries, the outcomes among the uninsured, the raw differences before matching, the differences after matching using propensity scores as weights, and the differences after matching using kernel weights. In the latter case, the t-statistics are based on bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications. The decile-specific ATT estimates reported in Table 9 were obtained using kernel weighting. To check the sensitivity of the results to one choice made in modeling exercise, Table 7 presents matching estimates obtained by deleting ineligible individuals before running the probit model and then defining the trimmed sample based on these scores. Table 8 contrast, has been significantly affected by HCFP, but the effect is negative: HCFP has encouraged people to switch from private providers to public ones. Table 9 suggests that HCFP's impact on average out-of-pocket spending has been similar for the poor and better off, but its impact on catastrophic spending has been felt largely among the bottom quintile. By contrast, as far as utilization is concerned, the impacts of HCFP seem to have been smallest among the poor. Indeed, among the poorest decile, there is barely any evidence of significant impacts of HCFP on utilization at all.
Among the second decile, there are five significant utilization impacts in Table 9 , while among the richest 80% of the eligible subsample (most eligible individuals are in the bottom half of the income distribution, not the upper half), there are seven significant utilization impacts. Furthermore, HCFP has not significantly affected the use of the private sector by the poorest 10%-the significant (negative) impacts are to be found among the other deciles.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
On the program's coverage, there is good news and bad. The good news is that HCFP is very well targeted on the Vietnam's poor: the poorest 20% of the population accounts for just over 50% of HCFP beneficiaries. The bad news-known already to the government-is that the program (at least as of 2004) was not covering all the intended groups: coverage ought to have been 31% or so in 2004; in the event, it was around 15%.
On impact, there is also good news and bad. The good news is that the program appears to be increasing the utilization of services quite considerably, and reducing the risk of catastrophic out-of-pocket spending. The bad news (or potentially bad news) is threefold.
First, there is no perceptible impact on (average) out-of-pocket spending, and even with HCFP coverage poor households are left spending a high share of their modest income on out-of-pocket health expenses and at considerable risk of catastrophic spending. Second, the utilization impact is far more pronounced for inpatient care than outpatient care. This may not necessarily be the most cost-effective way of improving the health of poor Vietnamese households, and may leave them facing costs-including transport costs, informal payments, etc.-that are higher than necessary. Third, the impacts on utilization are larger among the better off: among the poorest decile, utilization impacts are rarely significant.
What do the results suggest for fine-tuning of HCFP? The probit results in Table   3 suggest that the shortfall of coverage from the target rate has something to do with regional differences in implementation of the HCFP program, while the concentration curves in Figure 1 suggest that tighter targeting could be achieved by dropping residence in a Decision 135 commune as a qualification. A number of factors could help explain the negligible impact of the program on (average) out-of-pocket spending. It is possible that facilities may be permitted to levy some copayments. Some spending recorded in the survey may include spending for hotel and 'nonessential' items used by inpatients (e.g.
blankets, dressings, etc.). It is also highly plausible that the out-of-pocket payments recorded in the survey include informal payments, which of course are not reduced by the program. With inpatient care increasing so dramatically as a result of the program, such spending may well increase, offsetting at least in part the fall in fees and other costs covered by the program. Whether the especially large increase in inpatient care is a good thing is hard to say in the absence of a study that determines whether the (extra) care being delivered is called for given the diagnoses of the patients involved, and the most cost-effective way of improving their health. Finally, the smaller impacts among the poorest decile undoubtedly have much to do with the barriers that the poor face in using health services on top of the fees and drug costs they incur-the transport costs, the informal payments, the lost income, and so on. Others face these costs as well of course, but at least some of them (e.g. transport costs) may be higher for the poor; and as a share of income they are almost certain to be higher. Options worth exploring would be to subsidize the transport costs of the poor, or to pay them a cash sum when they use health 
